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The Return of the King: The Unsavory Origins of Administrative Law
Gary Lawson*
(forthcoming, Texas Law Review)

Abstract
Philip Hamburger’s Is Adminstrative Law Unlawful? is a truly brilliant and important
book. In a prodigious feat of scholarship, Professor Hamburger uncovers the British and civil
law antecedents of modern American administrative law, showing that contemporary
administrative law “is really just the most recent manifestation of a recurring problem.” That
problem is the problem of power: its temptations, its dangers, and its tendency to corrupt.
Administrative law, far from being a distinctive product of modernity, is thus the “contemporary
expression of the old tendency toward absolute power – toward consolidated power outside and
above the law.” It represents precisely the forms of governmental action that constitutionalism –
both in general and as specifically manifested in the United States Constitution – was designed
to prevent. Accordingly, virtually every aspect of modern administrative law directly challenges
the Constitution.
This extraordinary book will be immensely valuable to anyone interested in public law.
My comments here concern two relatively minor points that call for more clarification. First,
Professor Hamburger does not clearly identify what it means for administrative law to be
“unlawful.” Does that mean “in violation of the written Constitution”? “In violation of
unwritten constitutional norms?” In violation of natural law”? There is evidence that Professor
Hamburger means something more than the former, but it is not clear what more is intended. In
order to gauge the real status of administrative law, we must have a more direct conception of
law than Professor Hamburger provides.
Second, much of Professor Hamburger’s historical and constitutional analysis focuses on
the subdelegation of legislative authority. While his discussion contains numerous profound
insights, including some that require correction in my own prior scholarship on the subject, it
does not discuss how to distinguish interpretation by judicial and executive actors from
lawmaking by those actors. Presumably, the prohibition on subdelegation of legislative authority
prohibits only the latter. Figuring out where interpretation ends and lawmaking begins is one of
the most difficult questions in all of jurisprudence, and I am not convinced that Professor
Hamburger can successfully perform an end-run around it.
But these are modest nitpicks about a path-breaking work that should keep people of all
different persuasions engaged and occupied for quite some time.

After teaching and researching a subject for more than a quarter of a century, one does
not normally expect to encounter a 500-plus page book on that subject from which one learns
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something new on almost every page. Even less does one normally expect such a book from an
author whose scholarly expertise lies outside the relevant field of study. But Philip Hamburger’s
brilliant book, Is Administrative Law Unlawful?,1 defies expectations, transcends boundaries, and
extends the domain of human knowledge in too many directions to encapsulate in a brief review.
I am honored to have the opportunity to comment on this extraordinary work, and I am
profoundly grateful to Professor Hamburger, as should be anyone interested in administrative
law or the American Constitution, for the insights that he provides. This is a book that will (or at
least ought to) change the way even long-time scholars -- and I suppose that I am unhappily old
enough to bear that title -- will look at the history, practice, and doctrine of administrative law.
Professor Hamburger, a legal historian by trade, has turned his prodigious talents to
uncovering the British and civil law antecedents of modern American administrative law.
Contrary to the common misperception that there is something distinctive about modernity that
gives rise to the administrative state, he shows that contemporary administrative law “is really
just the most recent manifestation of a recurring problem.”2 That problem is the problem of
power: its temptations, its dangers, and its tendency to corrupt. The nature of power – and of the
people who seek it -- has changed little over time. Administrative law is thus the “contemporary
expression of the old tendency toward absolute power – toward consolidated power outside and
above the law.”3
To some extent, those antecedents of modern administrative law have been hiding in
plain sight for centuries. It is no great secret that the American Constitution “was designed
* Philip S. Beck Professor, Boston University School of Law.
1

PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? (2014).

2

Id. at 5.

3

Id. at 16.
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specifically to prevent the emergence of the kinds of institutions that characterize the modern
administrative state”4 and that this eighteenth-century design was inspired largely by events in
American colonial and British history. Professor Hamburger’s great achievement is to
systematize and document this history, to integrate it into a coherent narrative, and to provide a
comprehensive account of the myriad ways in which modern administrative law recreates
governmental pathologies that the founding generation in this country thought “were safely
buried in the past.”5
Nestled within the broader narrative is a treasure trove of detailed information about
numerous topics in public law. Careful readers of this book gain deeper understandings of, inter
alia, the problem of legislative delegation (or sub-delegation),6 the nature of executive power,7
the proper limits on agency investigatory authority,8 the seriously under-analyzed line between
civil and criminal proceedings,9 the dangers of administrative waivers,10 and even the executive
role in awarding patents.11 More broadly, one acquires new perspectives on such matters as the
role of specialization of knowledge as a foundation for separation of powers;12 the class bias that
underlies the expansion of the administrative state, in which power systematically flows to those

4

Gary Lawson, Burying the Constitution under a TARP, 33 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 55, 55 (2010).

5

HAMBURGER, supra note 1, at 130.

6

See, e.g., id. at 37-39, 43-44, 377-86.

7

See, e.g., id. at 51-54, 89-95.

8

See id. at 183-90, 237-40.

9

See id. at 60-61, 228-30, 265-68.

10

See id. at 120-27.

11

See id. at 198-202.

12

See id. at 325-45.

with appropriate credentials and connections;13 and the role played– both today and in the past –
by judicial deference in the rise of administrative governance.14 After scrutinizing this book, one
will never think of Chevron,15 or even of Crowell v. Benson,16 in quite the same way again.
Professor Hamburger also definitively puts to rest the shibboleth that modern
circumstances are somehow unique and call for novel forms of governance.17 Professor
Hamburger surgically dissects this claim by showing that every important aspect of modern
administrative government has precedents in British legal history.18
It thus is not a coincidence that administrative law looks remarkably similar to the
sort of governance that thrived long ago in medieval and early modern England
under the name of the “prerogative.” In fact, the executive’s administrative power
revives many details of [the] king’s old prerogative power. Administrative law
thus turns out to be not a uniquely modern response to modern circumstances, but
the most recent expression of an old and worrisome development.19

13

14

15

See id. at 370-74.
See id. at 285-98, 313-19.
Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

16

285 U.S. 22 (1932). Strictly speaking, Crowell ruled against deference to agency fact-finding in the particular
circumstances at issue, but its dictum broadly approving of such deference in most cases, see id. at 56-58, has
proven far more influential. For an enlightening account of Crowell’s evolution and influence, see Mark Tushnet,
The Story of Crowell: Grounding the Administrative State, in FEDERAL COURTS STORIES 354 (Vicki C. Jackson &
Judith Resnick eds., 2010).

17

See, e.g., JAMES LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 1-2 (1938); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,
372 (1989) (“in our increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and more technical problems,
Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives”).

18

See HAMBURGER, supra note 1, at 493 (“Although binding administrative power is widely said to be a novelty,
which developed in response to the necessities of modern life, it is as ancient as the desire for consolidated power
outside and above the law”).
19

Id. at 5-6.

The administrative state is not something that the founding generation simply could not have
imagined. The founders did not need to imagine it, because they and their ancestors lived it –
and resoundingly rejected it.20
Most fundamentally, Professor Hamburger’s scholarship makes it impossible for serious
thinkers to overlook the crucial distinction between executive acts that purport to bind subjects21
and executive acts that purport merely to instruct executive agents or exercise coercion against
non-subjects.22 This distinction runs through much of the book, and it helps to explain a host of
historical and doctrinal puzzles that continue to arise today. For example, it is only the former
kind of executive actions – attempts by the executive, with or without statutory authorization, to
constrain subjects -- that raise constitutional problems of adjudication outside of Article III and
raise broader jurisprudential problems of extra-legality and absolutism. Professor Hamburger
makes this point with clarity and emphasis, and for this reason alone Is Administrative Law
Unlawful? serves as a prolegomenon to any future work involving the separation of powers.
The book’s sheer scope, of course, invites fair criticism. Administrative law scholars can
justly claim that Professor Hamburger’s treatment of modern administrative law doctrine is very
thin, and constitutional law scholars can say much the same thing about his treatment of
constitutional doctrine. But, apart from the fact that extended treatment of either topic would
expand an already-lengthy book, Professor Hamburger was not really writing a book on
administrative or constitutional doctrine. Nor is it a straightforward work in legal history, as it
devotes much attention to relating that history to modern conditions and problems. In some
20

See id. at 495-96.

21

Professor Hamburger uses the term “subjects” to mean “all persons who, on account of their allegiance to a
sovereign, are subject to its laws.” Id., at 2 n.a. This includes citizens as well as non-citizen aliens who are lawfully
present within the sovereign’s jurisdiction.

22

See, e.g., id. at 2-5.

sense, the book is best viewed as a call to arms – and perhaps a literal one23 -- to recognize some
very profound dangers of administrative governance.24 Professor Hamburger writes – repeatedly
-- that administrative power “runs outside the law,”25 “abandons rule through and under the
law,”26 “threatens the liberty enjoyed under law,”27 “has resuscitated the consolidated power
outside and even above the law that once was recognized as absolute,”28 and constitutes a form
of “soft absolutism or despotism.”29 But to emphasize this feature of Is Administrative Law
Unlawful? may downplay the book’s scholarly erudition and depth, which can surely be
appreciated even by the staunchest supporters of the modern state who might scoff at these
characterizations of administrative governance as hyperbole.30 This is a book that defies easy
categorization, and it should prove invaluable to almost anyone interested in public law.
Any substantive comment on so ambitious and integrated a book risks diminishing its
significance by focusing on particular matters, and especially on matters that the reviewer
regards as shortcomings, but that is unavoidable. Accordingly, I will direct my comments here
to one conceptual gap and to one important doctrinal implication that requires more elaboration,

23

See id. at 489.

24

See id. at 9 (“the argument of this book is of a more expansive sort than may be expected by legally trained
readers. Whereas most legal arguments rest on doctrine, the argument here . . . is more substantively from the
underlying danger”).

25

Id. at 6.

26

Id. at 7.

27

Id.

28

Id. at 494.

29

Id. at 508.

30

To be very clear, Professor Hamburger is (alas!) hardly a libertarian. He lodges no objection to the scope of the
modern state. He objects only to the administrative forms through which the power of the modern state is exercised.
See id. at 2.

with no suggestion that these are the most significant aspects of the book, or even representative
of it, rather than simply reflections of my own idiosyncratic interests.
Conceptually, the book’s biggest defect is its failure to define precisely what it means by
the term “unlawful.” Does that mean “in violation of the written Constitution”? “In violation of
unwritten constitutional norms?” “In violation of natural law”? Professor Hamburger seems to
mean something more than the former, but it is not clear what more is intended, and that
ambiguity hangs over the entire project.
Doctrinally, Professor Hamburger’s work sheds valuable light on the problem of
delegation – or, more precisely, sub-delegation – of legislative power. His analysis clarifies, and
in some vital ways corrects, my own writing on the subject. But more remains to be said on the
relationship between legislation and interpretation, and I hope in this Comment to flesh out that
relationship a bit.
I emphasize that both of these points are relatively minor in the context of Professor
Hamburger’s project, and nothing that I say here should detract from the fact that this is one of
the most important books to emerge in my lifetime.31

I

The unlawfulness of administrative law highlighted by the book’s title appears constantly
as a theme throughout the work. At every stage of Professor Hamburger’s analysis, we are
reminded that modern administrative practices, as well as their pre-modern forbearers, are
31

Barely a week after I wrote this sentence, Scott Johnson on Powerlineblog said that Is Administrative Law
Unlawful? “is the most important book I have read in a long time.” See
http://www.powerlineblog.com/archives/2014/07/is-administrative-law-unlawful-a-word-from-the-author.php
(visited July 2, 2014).

“extralegal,” “above and outside the law,” expressions of “absolute power,” and the like.32 At
the end of the day, however, it is unclear exactly what Professor Hamburger means when he
describes administrative law as “unlawful.”
To be sure, Professor Hamburger specifically defines how he is using terms such as
“extralegal,” “supralegal,” and “absolute power.” The term “extralegal,” as employed by
Professor Hamburger, does not mean “legally unauthorized.” For
quite apart from the question of legal authorization, there remains the underlying
problem of extralegal power – the problem of power imposed not through the law,
but through other sorts of legal commands. On this basis, when this book speaks
of administrative law as a power outside the law – or an extralegal, irregular, or
extraordinary power – it is observing that administrative law purports to bind
subjects not through the law, but through other sorts of directives.33
Extralegal power is thus “power exercised not through law or the courts, but through other
mechanisms.”34
Supralegal power, for its part, “rose above the law in the sense that it was not accountable
to law. Supralegal power thus stood in contrast to ideas about the supremacy of the law, and
judges were expected to defer to it, without holding it fully accountable under the law.”35 And
absolute power, as defined by Professor Hamburger, is not necessarily unlimited power, but
rather is power “exercised outside the law , . . . exercised above the law . . . [a]nd where, as

32

I wanted to say that these expressions appear on almost every page, but documenting such a claim would be
tedious. So I randomly opened the book to five pages (60, 118, 174, 250, and 308), and discussions of “extralegal”
or “absolute” power appeared on three of them.

33

Id. at 23.

34

Id. at 24.

35

Id.

usual, it combined the otherwise separate legislative, judicial, and executive powers, . . .
consolidated.”36
Putting all of this together, it appears as though administrative law is “unlawful” in
Professor Hamburger’s terms because it involves the exercise of coercive power against subjects
through forms other than legislation or court adjudication implemented by bodies specializing in
these functions. To which a defender of modern administration will likely respond with
something on the order of, “Well, duh.”37 No one disputes that agency rulemaking is not
legislation (though some may argue that it is authorized by legislation) or that agency
adjudication is not judicial action (though some may argue that agencies are in some sense
adjuncts to courts or in a kind of collaborative “partnership” with courts). Many will claim that
such agency rulemaking or adjudicative action is nonetheless lawful, but that is simply because
they do not agree with Professor Hamburger that lawful coercive action against subjects can
occur only through legislation and court adjudication, not because they think agency action
actually conforms to the requirements set forth by Professor Hamburger. Professor Hamburger
claims that “[e]ven the defenders of executive legislation do not ordinarily call it ‘law.’ ”38 That
is manifestly not so,39 and even if it was, I am quite confident that champions of administrative
government would be very happy to change their vocabulary if it actually was important so to
do.

36

Id. at 25.

37

See, e.g., Alan B. Morrison, Administrative Agencies Are Just Like Legislatures and Courts – Except When
They’re Not, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 79 (2007).

38

39

HAMBURGER, supra note 1, at 351.

See, e.g., CORNELIUS M. KERWIN, RULEMAKING: HOW GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WRITE LAW AND MAKE POLICY
(1994). Professor Hamburger recognizes this in spots. See HAMBURGER, supra note 1, at 23 (“apologists for
administrative law may be inclined to suggest that it is not an extralegal power, but another sort of law”).

Of course, if the very concept of lawfulness necessarily requires action through
legislation or court adjudication, then administrative law is unlawful. Does this mean that
Professor Hamburger’s central thesis is definitional and therefore trivial?
It certainly is very far from trivial if agency exercises of non-legislative, non-court power
are unconstitutional and thus unlawful in that specific sense. There is much in Professor
Hamburger’s book to indicate how and why a good deal of modern administrative practice is
rather flagrantly unconstitutional. Delegation of legislative power; the combination of
legislative, executive, and judicial powers in the same institution; adjudication without full
judicial process; and the circumvention of both grand and petit juries are just among the most
obvious ways in which administrative law subverts the United States Constitution.40 As
Professor Hamburger details at great length, some of the most fundamental features of the
American Constitution, as well as its uncodified British predecessor, were constructed precisely
to foreclose many of the institutions of modern governance. He thus writes that “administrative
law revives a sort of power that constitutions were emphatically designed to prohibit.”41 At more
length:
Like the English Crown before the development of English constitutional
law, the American executive seeks to exercise power outside the law and the
adjudications of the courts . . . .
Constitutional law, however, developed precisely to bar this sort of
consolidated extra- and supralegal power . . . . The [English] constitution . . .
clarified that the government had to rule through regular law and adjudication.
Indeed, it was understood to place the lawmaking and judicial powers in
specialized institutions and to subject these powers to specific processes and
rights.
40

For a brief introduction to the rampant unconstitutionality of modern administration, see HAMBURGER, supra
note 1, at 498-99; Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231 (1994).
Professor Hamburger’s potent elaborations on and extensions of this point are too numerous even for a string
citation. Indeed, they are the central themes of the book.
41

HAMBURGER, supra note 1, at 8.

Americans echoed all of this in their constitutions. They made clear that
their governments enjoyed power only under the constitutional law made by the
people and that the law of the land was supreme. They specified that their
governments were to exercise legislative power through the acts of their
legislatures, and judicial power through the adjudications of their courts, and they
subjected these powers to constitutional processes and rights . . . .
As a result, the governments established by Americans could bind them
only through regular legislation and adjudication, not through executive acts
. . . .42
If consistency with the Constitution is the relevant species of lawfulness, then much, and indeed
most, of federal administrative law is rather plainly unlawful. There are more than occasional
suggestions in the book that this is precisely what Professor Hamburger has in mind by
unlawfulness.43
Nonetheless, I do not believe that Professor Hamburger’s argument about administrative
unlawfulness is reducible to strictly constitutional terms, at least not as the word “constitutional”
is generally used by American scholars. Several considerations feed into this belief.
First, Professor Hamburger states outright that simple constitutional analysis does not
communicate everything that he thinks is important about the unlawfulness of administrative
law. A constitutionalist approach, he says, “reduces administrative law to an issue of law
divorced from the underlying historical experience and thus separated from empirical evidence
about the dangers.”44 Again: “The danger of prerogative or administrative power . . . arises not
simply from its unconstitutionality, but more generally from its revival of absolute power.”45

42

Id. at 494.

43

See, e.g., id. at 30 (“The Constitution . . . was framed to bar any such extralegal, supralegal, and consolidated
power. It therefore must be asked whether administrative power is unlawful”) (emphasis added); id. at 281 (equating
being “outside the law” with being “outside the acts, institutions, processes, and rights established by the
Constitution”); id. at 480 (identifying illegitimacy with unconstitutionality); id. at 496 (identifying “real law” with
the Constitution).

44

Id. at 15.

45

Id. at 493 (emphasis added).

Yes, Professor Hamburger argues in great detail that administrative law is unconstitutional -- or,
more precisely, anti-constitutional. But that does not seem to be all that he is arguing.
Second, Professor Hamburger does not directly engage the originalism/livingconstitutionalism debate, much less the numerous sub-debates within those broad categories, and
he does not stake out a particular theory of constitutional interpretation. If his argument was
grounded solely on a constitutionalist account of law, one would expect to see a very different
kind of argument than he offers. He criticizes a “living constitutionalism” defense of
administrative governance, but that critique already presupposes that administrative law is
unlawful on some basis.46 It is not a full-throated argument about constitutional interpretation.
Third, Professor Hamburger’s argument is not only about the particular governmental
scheme represented by the United States Constitution. At times his account of constitutionalism
includes references to state constitutions, 47 and at other times it seems to include the British
constitution as well.48 He often seems to use the term “constitutionalism” to describe a very
broad set of principles that are part of the Anglo-American legal and political tradition49 rather
than simply adherence to concrete norms in the United States Constitution. Thus, his point
seems to be that there is something lawless about administrative governance that goes above and
beyond inconsistency with the governmental scheme embodied by the federal Constitution.
Fourth, when discussing the problem of subdelegation (of which I will say much more
shortly), Professor Hamburger observes that subdelegation of legislative power “departs not

46

See id. at 481-85.

47

See, e.g., id. at 494.

48

See, e.g., id. at 12.

49

See, e.g., id. at 488-89.

merely from the constitution, but from republican government itself,”50 thereby suggesting a
much deeper unlawfulness than mere(?) unconstitutionality.
If that is correct, so that lawfulness and unconstitutionality (in the sense of inconsistency
with the United States Constitution) are not completely co-extensive terms in Professor
Hamburger’s analysis, then one might be tempted to conclude that Professor Hamburger is
employing some conception of natural law, in which lawfulness is a concept that cannot be
reduced to compliance with particular authoritative sources. But while there is nothing wrong
(and, I happen to believe, a great deal right) about a natural-law metaphysics, I do not think it is
accurate to cast Professor Hamburger’s argument in natural-law terms either.
In support of some kind of natural-law understanding of Professor Hamburger’s
argument, one could point to his account of legal obligation. “[A]dministrative governance,” he
writes, “is a sort of power that has long been understood to lack legal obligation. It is difficult to
understand how laws made without representation, and adjudications made without independent
judges and juries, have the obligation of law; instead, they apparently rest merely on
governmental coercion.”51 Indeed, administrative forms of governance are so fundamentally
unlawful that they historically have served as grounds for revolution in both England and
America,52 thus suggesting that their unlawfulness goes beyond inconsistency with formal,
positive norms. This notion is reinforced to some degree (though, as we will see, not entirely) by
Professor Hamburger’s account of the binding quality of law. As I read Professor Hamburger,
for something to be law it must be not simply coercively enforced but also perceived as binding,

50

Id. at 385.

51

Id. at 489.

52

See id.

presumably through acquiring a representative pedigree.53 And “the postmedieval foundation of
legal obligation has been the consent of the people,”54 which in a large society necessarily
translates into government through representation.55 “Early Americans embraced this vision of
consent and self-government. They assumed that legislation was without obligation unless the
people imposed it on themselves in their representative legislature, and they eventually
established the nation and its constitution on this ideal.”56 Importantly, Professor Hamburger
presents this account of lawfulness-as-consent-through-representation as a preconstitutional
norm that was the “foundation” for the actual Constitution (and the nation that it created) but not
a product of that Constitution. Indeed, much of Professor Hamburger’s account of this “central
principle of American constitutional law”57 involves evidence from colonial times.58 Thus, one
might think, Professor Hamburger’s argument assumes that the very concept of law requires a
normatively sound theory of representation to back it up.59
I believe that this comes closer to Professor Hamburger’s real account of lawfulness than
either definitional fiat or narrow constitutionalism, but it still leaves some questions. Bruce
Ackerman has famously argued that the Constitution of 1788 was effectively “amended” during
the New Deal to authorize precisely the kind of administrative governance to which Professor

53

See id. at 356.

54

Id.

55

See id. at 356-58.

56

Id. at 358.

57

Id. at 359.

58

See id. at 358-59.

59

For Professor Hamburger’s detailed response to those who would defend the “representative” character of
administrative law through its link to presidentialism or some form of public participation, see id. at 360-69.

Hamburger objects.60 I have elsewhere argued that Professor Ackerman’s argument does not
validate the administrative state,61 and I am quite certain that Professor Hamburger would find
Professor Ackerman’s non-Article V “amendment” process lacking in transparency.62 But
suppose that Professor Ackerman is “right” in some important sense involving constitutionalism.
Or even more directly, suppose that some amendments validating administrative governance
were formally adopted using the procedures of Article V. In those circumstances, one could not
say that administrative governance was unconstitutional in the narrow sense of lacking
conformance to the United States Constitution. But would it be lawful? A natural lawyer could
comfortably say no if such a constitution is sufficiently lacking in normative bite. A positivist
could also say no if there is some recognized norm of legality that is pre-constitutional, to which
any constitution must conform in order to be lawful, that rules out administrative governance as a
valid form of social organization. Or one could, at that point, concede the legality of
administrative law (without necessarily conceding its wisdom).
What would be Professor Hamburger’s answer? In other words, what underlying
conception of lawfulness drives his analysis? I honestly do not know, and for me that is the most
nagging difficulty with this amazing book.

II

60

See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 34-57 (1991).

61

See Lawson, supra note 40, at 1250-52.

62

See HAMBURGER, supra note 1, at 482-83.

Many of the issues involving administrative governance revolve around the problem of
delegation of legislative authority. Administrative agencies make rules that have the force and
effect of law – that function as though they are statutes – but that do not go through the
constitutionally-prescribed (and representative) lawmaking process.63 Because the Constitution
vests “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted in a Congress of the United States,”64 Congress is
the only institution authorized to exercise federal legislative power. If agency rulemaking
amounts to the exercise of legislative power, it is rather obviously forbidden by the Constitution
– unless something in the Constitution authorizes Congress to delegate its legislative authority to
another actor. Much of Professor Hamburger’s book explains the origins and fundamentality of
this nondelegation principle.65 Without the shield of delegation, a great deal of modern
executive action amounts to precisely the kind of prerogative or rump legislation that both
British and American revolutionaries worked hard to abolish.
I have elsewhere written at great length, from the standpoint of formal constitutional
analysis, about why many modern statutes constitute delegations of legislative power and thus
fly in the face of the Constitution’s allocation of institutional authority.66 Most of my prior
writing focused on the Necessary and Proper Clause67 as the textual foundation for a
constitutional nondelegation principle. Congress can only do anything, including authorize other

63

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cls. 2-3. Administrative agencies, of course, also issue adjudicative orders that
function like court judgments but that do not have the procedural pedigree of legitimate court proceedings. I tried to
find something with which to disagree in Professor Hamburger’s too-lengthy-to-cite discussion of why
administrative adjudication is unlawful, but was unable to find enough of consequence to warrant discussion here.

64

Id. art. I, § 1.

65

See, e.g., HAMBURGER, supra note 1, at 377-402.

66

See Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327 (2002); Gary Lawson, Discretion as
Delegation: The “Proper” Understanding of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 235 (2005).
67

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.

agents to act, if there is some affirmative grant of power permitting it so to do. There is no
express “delegation of legislative power” clause, so the question (my past analysis reasoned) is
whether the Necessary and Proper Clause serves as an implicit authorization for delegations.
Suppose, for example, that Congress mandates that all health insurance policies provide
“essential health benefits” as part of their coverage.68 Congress could enumerate by statute the
precise content of what counts as “essential health benefits,” but could it instead provide that the
Secretary of Health and Human Services shall designate the appropriate “essential health
benefits”?69 The constitutional argument in favor of such a law would be that the instruction to
the Secretary to define the relevant term is “necessary and proper for carrying into Execution”
the statute and is thus authorized on Congress’s end. The Secretary, for his or her part, would
simply be executing the law by following to the letter its instruction to fill out the law if he or she
promulgated rules defining “essential health benefits,” and what could be a more straightforward
exercise of “executive Power” than following to the letter the instruction in a statute?
In past years, I would have analyzed such a statute by asking two complementary
questions: (1) whether it granted so much legislative-like discretion to executive agents that it
was not a “proper” law for carrying federal power into effect and therefore exceeded Congress’s
power to enact and (2) whether it involved so much legislative-like discretion that it did not
constitute “executive” power and thus exceeded the executive’s power to implement. Professor
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Hamburger insists that this analysis, while fine as far as it goes, is impoverished and incomplete,
because it overlooks “two more basic points”:70
First, delegation is a principle underlying all grants of power by the
people, and thus the barrier to subdelegation is not merely a doctrine or
implication derived from the Constitution’s text. And because the barrier to
subdelegation arises from the initial delegation of power by the people, it
precludes much more than the subdelegation of legislative power through the
necessary and proper clause. More broadly, it bars any subdelegation of
legislative power.71
Professor Hamburger is absolutely right on all fronts, and any sound analysis of delegation must
take his argument into account.72
For starters, he is right that one should never speak of the “delegation” of congressional
legislative authority. One instead should speak of its “subdelegation.”73 This is not a mere
matter of terminology; it goes to the substance of the constitutional problem with executive (and,
for that matter, judicial) exercises of lawmaking discretion. The Constitution creates all of the
institutions of the national government and vests them with all of the powers that they have. In
that sense, the “legislative Powers herein granted” to Congress are a delegation of those powers
from “We the People”74 who initially possessed them. If Congress attempts to pass those powers
onto someone else, it is attempting to delegate a delegated power, which is subdelegation. Both
constitutional and conceptual analysis must thus focus on the propriety vel non of subdelegation
of legislative authority.
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Professor Hamburger is also right that, once viewed as subdelegation, all transfers of
legislative power are invalid, whether effectuated through the Necessary and Proper Clause or
some other means. The principle against subdelegation does not depend on the language of a
particular clause but instead infuses the entire Constitution.
If there is any “textual” hook through which Professor Hamburger’s historical account of
subdelegation finds constitutional expression, it is the Preamble. The Preamble provides:
We the People of the United States in Order to form a more perfect Union,
to establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense,
promote the general Welfare, and secure the blessings of Liberty to ourselves and
our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of
America.75
By “ordain[ing] and establish[ing]” the various institutions of governance created by the
Constitution, We the People purported to authorize various agents – Congress, the President, the
Vice President, the federal courts, appointed federal officers, presidential electors, amending
conventions, and in a few instances state officials – to manage some portion of We the People’s
affairs. Instruments that authorize some people to exercise power on behalf of others were
commonplace in the eighteenth century – as they are today. Guardians, executors, factors,
attorneys under powers or letters of attorney, and the like all function as fiduciaries, exercising
power on behalf of others, pursuant to authorization from agency instruments. In form, the
Constitution is an agency instrument within this broad category. It is, as James Iredell termed it
at the North Carolina ratifying convention, “a great power of attorney.”76
A full discussion of the reasons for viewing the Constitution in agency or fiduciary terms,
and the implications of that characterization of the document for constitutional interpretation,
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would require a book. Such a book is forthcoming77; until then, one can find a brief introduction
to the argument in a short article78 and foundational background in several articles by Robert
Natelson,79 who deserves credit for re-introducing the fiduciary conception of the Constitution
into modern law and scholarship. For now, the key point is that agency instruments in the
eighteenth century -- and today -- were read in light of a thick set of interpretative rules. One of
the most basic interpretative features of agency or fiduciary instruments was/is that agents
exercising delegated power generally could not subdelegate that power without specific
authorization in the instrument. Rob Natelson has articulated the relevant background rule as of
the late eighteenth century:
When not authorized in the instrument creating the relationship, fiduciary
duties were nondelegable. The applicable rule was delegatus non potest delegare
– the delegate cannot delegate. As Matthew Bacon phrased it in his A New
Abridgment of the Law, “One who has an Authority to do an Act for another, must
execute it himself, and cannot transfer it to another; for this being a Trust and
Confidence reposed in the Party, cannot be assigned to a stranger.” In England,
positions whose holders could assign them to others were designated “offices of
profit,” but positions that were unassignable without prior authorization were
“offices of trust.”80
Thus, because the Constitution is a species of agency instrument, the presumption is that
delegated powers cannot be subdelegated, absent an express delegation authorization. There is
no such express delegation clause. The Necessary and Proper Clause is not nearly express
77
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enough to authorize delegation of legislative power. Indeed, as my previous arguments
demonstrate at length, the Necessary and Proper Clause is more easily read, in the context of the
Constitution, affirmatively to forbid delegations than affirmatively to permit them.
The agency-law conception of the Constitution, and its implication of non-subdelegation
of legislative authority, gibes perfectly with Professor Hamburger’s historical analysis of the
problem of subdelegation (which, I submit, is quite likely the consequence of both arguments
being correct). Indeed, after tracing the prohibition on legislative delegation from John Locke
through Whig theory through Tory arguments into American republican theory,81 Professor
Hamburger explicitly notes the agency-law connection to delegation:
[I]f the principal selects his agent for her knowledge, skill, trustworthiness, or
other personal qualities, he presumably gave the power to her, not anyone else. Of
course, a principal could expressly subdelegation, but he could not otherwise be
understood to have intended this . . . .
On such reasoning, the principle of delegation bars any subdelegation of
legislative powers to Congress. The people, moreover, specify that they grant the
legislative powers to a Congress “consist[ing] of a Senate and House of
Representatives,” with members chosen in specified ways. The delegation to
Congress thus is to a body chosen for its institutional qualities, including
members chosen by their constituents for their personal qualities. Congress and its
members therefore cannot subdelegate their power.82
The overwhelming force of these considerations can be seen graphically by examining a list of
constitutional provisions, and subsequent amendments, that deal with the selection, structure, and
operation of Congress. This list does not include provisions that describe the scope of
Congress’s legislative powers or prescribe the requirements for valid lawmaking; these are
provisions dealing with the composition and mechanics of the federal legislature:
Article I, § 1
Article I, § 2, cl. 1
81
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Article I, § 2, cl. 2
Article I, § 2, cl. 3
Article I, § 2, cl. 4
Article I, § 2, cl. 5
Article I, § 3, cl. 1
Article I, § 3, cl. 2
Article I, § 3, cl. 3
Article I, § 3, cl. 4
Article I, § 3, cl. 5
Article I, § 4, cl. 1
Article I, § 4, cl. 2
Article I, § 5, cl. 1
Article I, § 5, cl. 2
Article I, § 5, cl. 3
Article I, § 5, cl. 4
Article II, § 2, cl. 3
Article II, § 3
Amend. XIV, § 2
Amend. XIV, § 3
Amend. XV
Amend. XVII
Amend. XIX
Amend. XX
Amend. XXIV
Amend. XXVI
Amend. XXVII.
In view of the attention paid by the Constitution to the selection and activity of the members of
Congress, it is nothing short of farcical to argue that the Constitution implicitly countenances
delegation of legislative authority through the backdoor of the Necessary and Proper Clause. No
agency instrument would contain such detailed selection procedures and then implicitly allow an
end-run around them. It is not an argument that can be advanced with a straight face by an
honest interpreter.83
One short detour before the pay-off from this analysis: Just as the Constitution contains
no clause explicitly authorizing the delegation of legislative power, it also contains no clauses
83
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authorizing delegation of executive or judicial power. Are those powers also nondelegable? The
answer is yes. In the case of judicial power, judges who, either from laziness or incapacity,
delegate the decisionmaking task to others such as law clerks are breaching their fiduciary duties
and should be impeached and removed from office. The case of executive power is a bit more
involved but ultimately the same. The President need not personally perform every executive
function, such as investigations and prosecutions, because the “executive Power” vested in the
President is the power either personally to execute the law84 or to supervise its execution by
subordinates.85 A president who shirks both of those duties in favor of, for example, extensive
golf outings is breaching a fiduciary duty and should be impeached and removed from office.
But the nature of executive power leaves room for more dispersal of that power to subordinates
than is the case with either the judicial or legislative powers.
Professor Hamburger seems to believe that some portion of the executive power can be
allocated to subordinates because the Article II Vesting Clause does not say that all “executive
Power” is vested in the President.86 The Constitution, however, vests “[t]he” executive power –
meaning all of the executive power – in the President. There is no executive power remaining to
be vested in anyone else. If Congress grants power to a subordinate executive official, that
executive power automatically vests in the President by virtue of the Article II Vesting Clause.
The Constitution creates a unitary executive.87
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So what kind of power do subordinate executive officials exercise when they apply
statutes? The answer is, of course: executive power. Officers exist precisely in order to carry
laws into effect; their power so to do is what makes them officers.88 A law creating executive
officers, who can then carry laws into effect, is the quintessential law “necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution” federal powers. The Constitution thus specifically contemplates the
creation of officials other than the President who will exercise executive power. The Article II
Vesting Clause provides, however, that whenever an official is granted power to execute federal
law, the President is also granted that power whether or not the statute so specifies, along with a
corresponding obligation either to exercise the power personally or to supervise its execution.
That ultimate power of exercise or supervision cannot be delegated. Thus, there is no problem at
all with Congress authorizing subordinate officials to exercise executive power – so long as that
exercise is subject to supervision, oversight, and if necessary veto by the President.
Can one argue that Congress similarly satisfies its constitutional obligations by
supervising the exercise of lawmaking power by agencies? One can argue anything; the question
is whether the argument is good or bad, and this argument would be very, very bad. Legislative
power and executive power are different powers, which is why they are vested in different
institutions and subject to different procedural and substantive checks. The Constitution
specifies precisely how legislative power must be exercised: Article I, section 7 is quite detailed
on the point. There is nothing in that section about alternative lawmaking methods subject to
congressional supervision. There is nothing in the centuries-old Anglo-American conception of
legislative power, as it would have been understood by a reasonable person in 1788, which treats
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legislative power as a supervisory power over other legislators. Gooses and ganders may take
the same sauces, but legislative power and executive power are very different birds.
Executive power can be dispersed, up to a point, because of the nature of the power, but
legislative power is not divisible in this fashion. Representative William Findley of
Pennsylvania expressed this idea very eloquently in 1792 when he declared that “it is of the
nature of Executive power to be transferrable to subordinate officers; but Legislative authority is
incommunicable and cannot be transferred.”89 End of detour.
What does it matter whether a non-subdelegation principle is found in the Necessary and
Proper Clause or in the background rule of agency instruments? For most of the agency actions
that concern Professor Hamburger’s book, it matters not a bit. It makes a difference only when
someone attempts to justify subdelegation through some mechanism other than the Necessary
and Proper Clause. The most obvious candidate is the Territory and Property Clause of Article
IV, which grants Congress “Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations
respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States . . . .”90 This clause
could be thought to authorize broad delegations to executive officials in federal territories and
over federal property management – and I once so believed.91 I was wrong92 and Professor
Hamburger is right that all exercises of federal power are subject to the non-subdelegation rule.
Does that mean that Congress must pass meaningful rules for the management of the one-third of
the nation’s land mass owned by the federal government? Yes, that is what it means. This is not
89
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a startling conclusion, as the Constitution never contemplated that Congress would maintain
ownership and control over one-third of the nation’s land mass. If managing that property is too
much for Congress, Congress needs to unload the property – either onto states or private citizens.
Does this mean that Congress cannot allow self-government in federal territories because
territorial legislatures violate the non-subdelegation doctrine? Professor Hamburger sees
territorial governance as a limited and justified exception to the non-subdelegation principle,93
though I frankly find his reasons for justifying it difficult to grasp.94 More than two decades ago,
I disagreed and argued that territorial legislatures were unconstitutional.95 I changed my mind
after deciding that the Necessary and Proper Clause, which is not needed to create territorial
legislatures, was the source of the non-subdelegation principle, but I now think I was right the
first time. If that conclusion seems hard to swallow, it would not be difficult to devise fast-track
legislative methods for rubber-stamping the work product of territorial legislatures and giving it
the formal imprimatur of the Constitution’s lawmaking process.
Thus, Professor Hamburger and I disagree on some minor aspects of delegation, but we
agree on the big picture: there is no constitutional authorization for sub-delegation of legislative
power. The devil, however, is often in the details, and the details of subdelegation can be quite
vexing.
Suppose that Congress enacts a statute requiring employers to bargain collectively with
recognized groups of “employees.” A group of foremen, who “carry the responsibility for
maintaining quantity and quality of production, subject, of course, to the overall control and
93
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supervision of the management,”96 seeks recognition as a bargaining unit. In one sense, the
foremen are obviously “employees,” because the company pays their salaries. But the company
also pays the salary of the CEO, so the statute must have something more specific in mind by the
term “employee” than simply a contractual relationship with a company. Foremen have
responsibility, including possibly disciplinary responsibility, over other employees, but it seems
unlikely that the statutory term “employee” means only those people with no responsibility. The
applicability of the statute in these circumstances is not absolutely clear.
If the case goes directly to a court -- pretend for the moment that there is no National
Labor Relations Board -- should the court rule that the statute is invalid because it
unconstitutionally delegates legislative power to the court? I believe that Professor Hamburger
would say no. Certainly, this statute requires a degree of interpretation in these circumstances.
But more facts about the particular duties of the foremen, the relationship of the foremen to the
company’s senior management and lower-level workers, the customs and practices in the
relevant industry, the surrounding context of the statute, etc. might shed light on the proper
application of the statute. One can imagine a theory of statutory interpretation, and even multiple
theories of statutory interpretation, that could ultimately find a resolution to this question. This
kind of interpretative enterprise, using “ ‘artificial reason and judgment of law,’ ”97 seems part
and parcel of the judicial office. Statutes do not delegate legislative authority simply because
they do not resolve every possible application on their faces. Interpretation is an activity distinct
from lawmaking.
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Interpretation, however, can shade into lawmaking under certain conditions. Suppose
that Congress makes it unlawful “to maintain a borfin that schlumps on publicly-accessible
property whenever it is accompanied by” . . . and then the Statutes at Large contain an ink blot
(that roughly resembles a profile of the late Robert Bork) where one would expect the next word.
There is no additional relevant information about the statute. If a judge was to “construe” this
statute to reach any particular conduct, the judge would not be interpreting but would be
legislating. Not every action that takes the form of interpretation is actually interpretation.
Some activities really are interpretation and some really are not. Action-in-the-form-ofinterpretation that does not involve the true activity of interpretation is unlawful legislation. A
judge exercising judicial power should simply give this collection of words in the statute books
no effect in any particular case.
Now consider a statute that prohibits the importation, and provides for the civil forfeiture
of, any tea brought into the United States that, “in the opinion of the judge presiding over the
forfeiture proceeding, is inferior in quality” to certain standard samples of tea designated by
law.98 Unlike the borfin/ink-blot statute, this one is perfectly comprehensible. There is no
difficulty at all in grasping the law’s instructions. The problem is that it calls upon the judge to
make a decidedly un-judge-like determination of the quality of tea. The statute, in essence,
makes it unlawful to import tea that certain judges think does not taste good enough. Is applying
that statute a proper exercise of the “judicial Power,” and is a statute that calls for such a judicial
decision a valid exercise of legislative power? Has Congress in effect subdelegated legislative
power to the courts?
98
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To me, the answer is very clearly yes, that is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power. Even if Congress itself could pass “bills of attainder” against particular shipments of
tea,99 it cannot give that power to courts in the false guise of “interpretation.” Courts interpret
laws because and when the exercise of the “judicial Power” requires it, but not every activity that
takes the form of interpretation is actually an exercise of the judicial power.
How to draw the line between permissible interpretation and impermissible exercise of
legislative authority is a perennial nightmare. I have elsewhere catalogued at interminable length
the efforts of courts and scholars to come up with an accurate formulation for telling valid from
invalid statutes100 and ended up agreeing with Chief Justice Marshall that one must separate
“those important subjects, which must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself, from those
of less interest, in which a general provision may be made, and power given to those who are not
act under such general provisions to fill up the details.” 101 In other words, “Congress must make
whatever policy decisions are sufficiently important to the statutory scheme at issue so that
Congress must make them.”102 The line between interpretation and legislation turns on
impossible-to-quantify and difficult-to-describe distinctions among kinds and qualities of
discretion conferred by statutes. Or so I think. For his part, Professor Hamburger does not really
address this question. I would be very interested to hear how he draws the line between
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interpretation and legislation. I do not see how one can have a subdelegation doctrine without
some such line.
Executive officials also interpret statutes in the course of their activities. Is there any
meaningful difference between executive and judicial interpretation?
Professor Hamburger seems to suggest that the answer is yes. By his lights, judicial
interpretation – when it is actually interpretation of a valid statute – results in actual legal
consequences. If the statute is constitutionally valid, so is the judgment entered as a result of
(legitimate) interpretation of that statute. But as I understand Professor Hamburger, there is no
circumstance in which executive interpretation can have the same effect. Of course executives
can offer interpretations of statutes, but those are merely offerings – just as any random citizen
can offer an interpretation. They are not entitled to any deference from judges103 and they have
no independent legal force. As Professor Hamburger describes the early English history:
Moreover, the exposition of law was a matter of judgment about law, and
the law gave the office of judgment, at least in cases, to the judges. It thus
became apparent that the judges – indeed, only the judges in their cases – had the
power to give authoritative expositions of the law. Lawyers recited this in
constitutional terms – for example, when a lawyer argued in King’s Bench that “a
power is implicitly given to this court by the fundamental constitution which
makes the judges expositors of acts of Parliament.” The judges therefore could
not defer to interpretations of persons who were not the constitutional expositors,
let alone interpretations that were administrative exercises of legislative will.104
Professor Hamburger’s argument against binding executive statutory interpretation105 is
more powerful than I think many are likely to credit, but matters may be more complicated than
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he lets on. First, I do not think this argument can be confined just to laws that constrain subjects.
If Congress passes a benefits law that does not constrain, Congress’s exercise of lawmaking
power is just as subject to the fiduciary obligations inherent in the Constitution’s delegation of
legislative power to Congress as it is when Congress passes constraining laws. The
Constitution’s enumerated powers of Congress do not sort themselves into constraining and nonconstraining powers. The permissible activities of the executive may well depend on the
constraint/non-constraint distinction, but it is not clear to me that the permissible activities of the
legislature follow the same dichotomy. If that is right, there may be large classes of activity
involving statutory interpretation that takes place only in the executive, with no role for the
courts. In those circumstances, it is hard to operationalize the idea that executive interpretations
have no legal force. It is quite easy to grasp the implications of that idea when courts are
involved: the executive can say anything that it wants but the courts will ultimately make up their
own minds. If it is a decision that is not subject to judicial review, perhaps because of sovereign
immunity, then . . . what? I would be interested to know if Professor Hamburger thinks that
there are any circumstances in which executive interpretation is legally significant.
Second, the proper relationship between executive and judicial interpretation may be
more muddled than Professor Hamburger lets on. To be sure, I am no big fan of judicial
deference. I hold no brief for Chevron,106 and I think it is affirmatively unconstitutional for
Congress to order courts to defer to agencies (or even to tell courts what evidence they can
hear).107 Courts have an obligation to try their best to get the right answers to legal questions.
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But sometimes executive interpretations are good evidence of the right answer. If there are
whole classes of cases in which that is likely to be true, there may be reasons for giving weight to
the entire class of cases, if the costs of sorting out the considerations in each case are too high.
Courts do not have unlimited resources. Time spent figuring out the right answer in one case is
time not spent on other cases. I have no general theory of how hard decision-makers need to
work in any particular instance to get the right answer. Without such a general theory, it is
difficult to see how one can make categorical judgments about the permissibility of deference.
To be sure, Professor Hamburger is surely on safe ground criticizing the current regime
of deference. Categorical condemnations of any kind of deference regime are much trickier. I
am not saying that they cannot be made. I am just not sure that Professor Hamburger (or anyone
else, including most especially myself) has laid the full jurisprudential foundation necessary to
make them.
In sum, Professor Hamburger largely elides the line-drawing problem posed by any
attempt to distinguish interpretation from legislation by categorically removing all executive
statutory interpretation from the table. This move may be more problematic than it seems at first
glance. If such a move is not available, then I think that Professor Hamburger needs to say more
about what kinds of executive interpretations cross the line into legislation.

***

On both counts – the meaning of lawfulness and the appropriate line between
interpretation and legislation – my call is for more explanation from Professor Hamburger. Of
course, more of anything from Professor Hamburger is always welcome. Topping Is

Administrative Law Unlawful? is going to be difficult, even for him, but I fervently hope that he
gives it a try.

